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Abstract 
We study the relation between conjugal family ties and corruption. Our 
theoretical model shows that the population share of people who have a 
desire to retain close ties with their families (i.e., the extensive margin) has an 
ambiguous effect on the level of corruption, due to the presence of conflicting 
mechanisms. However, the strength of this desire among people who want to 
retain close ties with their families (i.e., the intensive margin) has an 
unambiguously negative effect on corruption. The latter outcome finds 
support from our empirical analysis: Using micro-level data, we show that, in 
contrast to conventional wisdom and cross-country reflections, stronger 
family ties are negatively correlated with a broad set of activities that measure 
corruption.        
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1   Introduction 
Corruption is a phenomenon whose adverse social and economic effects can be wide-
ranging (e.g., Mauro 1995; Tanzi and Davoodi 1998). For this reason, the identification of 
various factors that fuel corruption has held a prominent place in the research agenda of 
many fields, including economics. As a result, a large body of work has pinpointed 
several factors that are responsible for high levels of corruption – factors that include 
economic, administrative, historical, and cultural ones.1 Our study contributes to a 
further understanding of the cultural sources behind high corruption, as it aims at 
examining the role of family ties. Specifically, it focuses on conjugal (or nuclear) family ties 
– rather than extended kinship ties - and aims at investigating, both theoretically and 
empirically, their impact on people’s willingness to engage in corrupt behaviour and, 
therefore, the level of corruption.2   
The results from existing empirical work on the link between corruption and 
family ties is rather mixed: While the study by Marè et al. (2016) finds that family ties are 
associated with higher levels of corruption, Ljunge (2015) reports that family ties 
promote civic virtues – among them, the disapproval of corruption. In general, while the 
link between family ties and corruption has already attracted the interest of empirically-
oriented work, the existing literature lacks a systematic theoretical study that identifies 
possible mechanisms through which family ties affect people’s attitudes towards 
corruption. One of our study’s aims is to fill this gap in the literature.  
Given its focus on conjugal family ties, our theory borrows elements from 
Alesina et al. (2015) – the agents’ locational preference contingent on their desire to retain 
close ties with their families – and expands them by incorporating public sector 
employment, which gives the opportunity of illegal rent-seeking through corruption. 
From a certain perspective, our theoretical model delivers mechanisms that explain why 
                                                 
1 This literature is very extensive and has traced several factors, such as opportunities for rents and 
discretionary power (Klitgaard 1988); regulation, taxation and below market-price provision of goods (Tanzi 
1988; De Soto 1989); and the level of public sector wages (Haque and Sahay 1996) among others. Treisman 
(2000) explores a series of determinants that are correlated with corruption, such as legal origin and 
institutions, whereas Hauk and Sáez-Martí (2002) and Barr and Serra (2010) emphasise the role of culture 
and norms.  
2 The difference between conjugal family and extended kinship is that the former considers the nucleus of 
parents and children whereas the latter considers an extended network of relatives, clans etc. See Enke 
(2019) for a study that investigates the economic implications of extended kinship ties.   
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the effect of family ties on corruption can be ambiguous. On the one hand, people’s 
desire to retain strong family ties reduces the range of high-productivity opportunities 
to which they can be employed, due to their reluctance to reside away from their 
parents, hence tempting them to compensate for this shortfall through the ill-gotten 
gains of corrupt behaviour. On the other hand, however, the utility cost that emanates 
from the chastisement and the stigma attached to the revelation of corrupt behaviour, 
has a more pronounced effect on people who possess a sense of strong family ties, thus 
acting as a counter-incentive for them to seek illegal rents through corruption. Overall, 
when the measure of family ties is the population share of those who abide by them, 
family ties may be associated with either more or less favourable attitudes towards 
corrupt behaviour – and, therefore, with either higher or lower incidence of corruption – 
depending on which of the two opposing mechanisms prevails.  
Our theory also offers another perspective that involves the potential measure of 
the strength of family ties. The argument is that, in addition to the share of people who 
have a desire to retain close ties with their conjugal families, what is also important is 
how strong this desire is. In other words, our point of view is that both the extensive and 
the intensive margins of family ties’ measurement merit consideration. For that reason, 
besides the prevalence of different family values among the population, our model also 
pinpoints another measure of family ties – i.e., the component that quantifies the utility 
accruing as a result of retaining close ties with one’s family. Under this measure, the 
relation between the strength of family ties and corruption is unambiguously negative. 
In other words, when the desire to retain close ties with the family increases, the 
incentive to be corrupt declines. 
This latter mechanism is actually the focus of our empirically strategy in 
investigating the interplay between corruption and family ties. We do not attempt to 
establish causality, a task that is rather demanding with survey data. Instead, we focus 
primarily in highlighting the correlation between the two variables, and in uncovering 
the underlying mechanisms. Methodologically, we test our reduced-form hypothesis 
using micro-level data from the European Values Study (EVS) and a variable developed 
by Alesina and Giuliano (2010) as a means of measuring the strength of family ties. Our 
empirical results support the hypothesis that stronger family ties are associated with 
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attitudes less favourable to corruption, thus they accord with the empirical outcomes in 
Ljunge (2015) and with broader arguments that stress the importance of familial 
experiences in determining civic values (e.g., Wilson 1993). Our results are robust to 
several different specifications, such as controlling for region fixed effects that captures 
even more unobservables, and to the use of different samples, e.g., the World Value 
Survey (WVS) instead of the EVS.  
Despite the fact that there are reasonable arguments to support an outcome 
whereby family ties reduce the incidence of corruption, still conventional wisdom and 
casual observation may be at odds with this view. After all, a simple observation of the 
European continent, for example, can reveal that corruption is more widespread among 
countries in Southern Europe – in which strong family ties are also more pervasive 
among the population – compared to Northern European countries – in which strong 
family ties are not as pervasive. How can this observation reconcile with our theoretical 
and empirical results? To see this, recall that, in our theoretical framework, it is possible 
that while the share of agents with preferences for maintaining close ties with their 
conjugal families – a population measure – is positively related to corruption, at the 
same time the strength of the desire to maintain close family ties is inversely related to 
corruption. In this respect, our micro-level empirical approach is primarily capturing 
outcomes that are consistent with the latter mechanism, given that our main source of 
variation is across-individual variation, without being necessarily at odds with cross-
country reflections on the issue. Indeed, we conduct an individual-level analysis and our 
results are derived after accounting for a wide range of individual and country controls 
such as country and year fixed effects, thus we obtain within-country estimates. In other 
words, we do not ignore other factors – on the contrary, they are an important part of 
the story and they are implicitly captured by the fixed effects. Our approach, however, is 
to highlight the micro-level factors. Therefore, our results should be primarily 
interpreted as suggesting that if two individuals live in the same county and are thus 
faced with the same institutional/historical/cultural background of the country, then 
those who have stronger desire for close family ties will be less favourable towards 
corruption. 
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Overall, our study contributes to two strands of the literature. First, it contributes 
to the literature that investigates the determinants of corruption. As we stated earlier, 
this literature is extensive and has identified several economic, institutional, historical 
and cultural factors (e.g., Klitgaard 1988; Tanzi 1988 De Soto 1989; Haque and Sahay 
1996; Treisman 2000; Barr and Serra 2010). Second, it contributes to the literature that 
investigates the impact of family ties on various economic and social outcomes.3 This 
literature has identified the implications of strong family ties for labour market 
outcomes (Alesina and Giuliano 2010; Alesina et al. 2015), geographical mobility 
(Giuliano 2007; Alesina and Giuliano 2010), education (Duranton et al. 2009), gender 
roles (Alesina and Giuliano 2013), economic systems and reform (Esping-Andersen 1999; 
Brumm and Brumm 2017; Galasso and Profeta 2018), trust (Alesina and Giuliano 2011), 
as well as ideology and political participation (Todd 1983; Alesina and Giuliano 2011). 
At this point, it should be noted that there is also a literature on the broader 
measure of kinship, as described and studied in the seminal paper of Enke (2019). 
However, in his study he highlights the fact that “…Alesina and Giuliano’s variable of 
nuclear family ties is conceptually distinct from anthropologists’ concept of extended kinship 
ties…” (Enke 2019, p.974). Moreover, the kinship variable in Enke (2019) comprises four 
different elements, i.e., extended family, joint residence, unilineal descent and clans – all 
of which are applicable primarily to an ethnic group analysis, hence they differ from the 
type of family ties modelled and empirically tested in our paper. We view the distinction 
between the two types of family ties as instrumental since each definition and approach 
captures different aspects of the topic and thus different mechanisms associated with it. 
Our study is structured as follows: In Section 2 we develop a theoretical model to 
study the underlying mechanisms that link corruption with the strength of family ties. 
Section 3 presents our empirical analysis and findings, and Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
 
                  
                                                 
3 There is also a newly emerging literature on the long-run determinants of family ties. For example, see Ang 
and Fredriksson (2017). 
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2   Theory   
The model draws on Alesina et al. (2015) with regard to its focus on conjugal family ties 
(rather than extended kinship ties) and their aspect of locational preference. We consider 
an economy that is populated by a constant mass (normalised to 1) of couples who live 
for three periods – childhood, youth and maturity. The individuals who comprise a 
couple are distinguished solely on the basis of occupational characteristics, the details of 
which will be discussed shortly. Nevertheless, each couple shares the same personality 
traits and preferences, and make all their decisions jointly. The demographic structure is 
simple, as each couple gives birth to a couple, and so on. Henceforth, we shall be 
referring to couples as ‘agents’. 
Agents form their personality traits and adopt values and norms, which will 
ultimately determine their desire to maintain close ties with their families, in their 
childhood. In this study, we are not going to be explicit about the process whereby 
agents adopt these cultural traits. Instead, we shall assume that a fixed fraction (0,1)f   
of agents wish to retain strong family ties, whereas the remaining fraction 1 f  do not 
have such a desire. This is a scenario where children simply adopt their parents’ cultural 
characteristics, hence allowing us to ignore any dynamics and to consider a static 
framework that focuses purely on the decisions made by agents when they are young. In 
what follows, agents are going to be distinguished by { , }j s w  where s  stands for 
agents who have a preference for strong family ties, while w  stands for agents whose 
preference for family ties is rather weak (or even absent).  
Young couples earn income, enjoy the consumption of (private and public) 
goods, and rear their children. There are two sources of income for each couple because 
the activity to which each individual will be engaged, with the purpose of earning 
income, differs. Particularly, one of them will operate as a perfectly competitive supplier 
of a privately-produced good; the other will be employed by the public sector (e.g., as a 
civil servant) contributing to the procurement of a utility-enhancing public good. 
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Private Production      
The producer of the private good will supply Y  units of it, meaning that this is also the 
amount of income that accrues to agents as a result of private production. We follow 
Alesina et al. (2015) in assuming that the productivity of private sector producers is a 
function of the location in which agents decide to reside. If agents are willing to move to 
any location away from their parents’ place of residence, private production will result 
in (1 )hY ω y   units of output with certainty, where , 0ω y  . If, however, agents restrict 
themselves in residing to the location of their parents, private production will result in 
the same amount of output, i.e., (1 )hY ω y  , only with probability (0,1)π  , whereas 
with probability 1 π  private production will generate lY y  units of output. One way 
to justify this assumption is to think that people can have a greater set of productive 
opportunities, and a better match for their skills, if they are more mobile in terms of 
location.  
Public Sector 
The government distributes an amount of output to each civil servant, with the 
condition that these funds should be used as an input in the operation of a project that 
contributes to the procurement of a utility-enhancing public good. In return, civil 
servants receive a salary 0B   for their services. Contrary to private sector producers, 
we assume that the productivity of individuals who work as civil servants is not affected 
by the location where agents reside. We will also assume that the production of public 
goods occurs prior to private production.4   
The government also levies a (lump-sum) tax 0T   from each agent, and uses 
the proceeds to finance its expenses for public sector salaries and for the provision of 
public goods. Using 0G   to denote the amount devoted to public goods’ provision, 
and taking account the unit mass of agents, it follows that the government’s budget is 
given by T G B  . We also assume that all items in the public budget are tied to the 
economy’s output by setting  
 B by , G gy , T τy ,  (1) 
                                                 
4 This assumption is innocuous for our results. See Footnote 9. 
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where , , (0,1)b g τ  . Therefore,  
 τ g b  .   (2) 
With the purpose of introducing the moral hazard problem that will ultimately 
generate the incidence of corruption, we follow Varvarigos and Arsenis (2015) in 
assuming that the delivery of public goods is possible through two types of projects. 
Type- H  projects return either 0γ   units of public goods with probability (0,1)p  or 
(0, )β γ  units of public goods with probability 1 p , for each unit of output invested in 
them. Note that the realisation of the state of nature is independently distributed across 
all Type- H  projects. Type- L  projects, on the other hand, return  ,δ β γ  units of public 
goods with certainty, for each unit of output invested in them. As long as 
(1 )pγ p β δ   , a condition that is assumed to hold hereafter, the expected return of 
Type- H  projects is strictly higher compared to the return of Type- L  projects. For this 
reason, the government imposes a condition on the employment contracts of civil 
servants, obliging them to operate only Type- H  projects. Nevertheless, some civil 
servants may have the incentive to invest only a fraction (0,1)βδ   of the funds allocated 
to them in the operation of a Type- L  project, resulting in an overall return of βδ βδ   
units of public goods per unit of funds allocated to the civil servant. They do so while 
making the false claim that all the funds available to them were invested in the 
operation of a Type- H  project, which eventually had a bad realisation of the state of 
nature. Doing so allows them to gain private rents, amounting to a fraction 1 βδ  of the 
funds that they should have invested in the first place.  
Nevertheless, the authorities may detect their malfeasance. In the event that the 
authorities detect and prosecute a case of corruption, the civil servant’s penalties involve 
the loss of his salary, in addition to the loss of his ill-gotten gains. Furthermore, the 
punishment, stigma and shame associated with the revelation of a civil servant’s 
misconduct is an impediment to the couple’s prospects of enjoying activities such as 
consumption and – for those with preferences for strong family ties – being close to their 
parents. For example, legal proceedings, the stigma of being a convicted fraudster and 
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the possible imprisonment can impinge on the number and the quality of interactions 
with the nuclear family. As we shall see shortly, these emotional costs entail a 
proportional loss in utility.  
A counter-argument could be that interactions with the close family may be less 
affected by issues such as legal proceedings, imprisonment, reputational damage etc., 
than interactions with acquaintances and friends, hence living near parents may be an 
attenuating factor to these costs. Our focus, however, is on people who have an 
increased desire to be close to – and to interact with – their parents. As long as the 
number of such interactions and the circumstances/environment under which these 
occur are affected by these issues, then they will surely impinge on the utility increment 
that people with strong family ties enjoy from being close to their parents.       
Let us assume that the probability of a Type- j  civil servant being apprehended 
and punished for his transgression, denoted Μ j , is uniformly distributed on [0,1]  
across all civil servants of the same type (i.e., { , }j s w ). Similarly to Varvarigos (2017), 
this form of heterogeneity captures the varying abilities of corrupt civil servants in 
avoiding the revelation of their misdemeanour. For example, it may capture varying 
degrees of vigilance and care in avoiding lifestyle choices and behaviour that could 
signal their excessive income. It may also capture varying degrees of networking with 
people who can assist them in eluding detection and punishment.5 With the purpose of 
simplifying the analysis, we shall employ the following functional form for the 
probability that a Type- j  civil servant’s nefarious activities will be eventually revealed: 
 Μ jj
j
μ
F ,  (3) 
where   
 [0, ] if[0,1 ] ifj
f j sμ f j w
  
,   if1 ifj
f j sF f j w
   
.  (4) 
If we denote the number of civil servants who will decide to be corrupt by Θ , it 
follows that the amount of public goods offered by the public sector, denoted a , can be 
                                                 
5 Another underlying assumption here is that the probability of detection is independent of the civil 
servant’s type (i.e., j s  or j w ). This is done purely as a means of analytical simplicity, with minimal cost 
to generality (if any).  
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expressed as {(1 Θ)[ (1 ) ] Θ }a G pγ p β β     . Taking account of (1), this expression can 
be rewritten as  
 [(1 Θ) ( ) ]a gy p γ β β    . (5)      
Preferences 
As we indicated previously, the decision to reside in the close vicinity of the agents’ 
parents will entail a productivity cost, manifested in the potential loss of income from 
private production. The reason why agents may still decide to do so however, relates to 
their preferences on the issue of family ties. Particularly, agents who have a desire for 
maintaining close family ties will either enjoy a utility gain if they reside in their parents’ 
location, or incur a utility cost if they move away from it. On the contrary, agents who 
have not adopted values that are supportive to family ties, do not gain nor lose any 
utility as a result of their choice of residence when they become adults. Formally, the 
Type- j  agents’ utility is given by  
 ( Φ )(1 )j j jU c S a    , (6)   
where jc  denotes consumption of private goods and  
 
if  and  reside in their parents' location
Φ if  and  reside away from their parents' location
0 if , irrespective of 
agents
agents
agenthe ' locatis ot n
j
φ j s
φ j s
j w
   
 (7)        
such that 0φ  .6 Furthermore, note that S  captures the proportional loss in utility, due 
to the chastisement, stigma and shame attached to the revelation of a corrupt civil 
servant’s wrongdoing. Given this, we assume that        
 
(0,1) if the civil servant is corrupt, and eventually revealed as such
0 if the civil servant is corrupt, but avoids detection
0 if the civil servant is honest
σ
S
 
 (8)        
Note that the specification in (6) assumes that the deleterious effects of stigma 
and punishment do not impinge on the utility from public goods. From a technical point 
of view, this assumption eliminates strategic considerations on the incentives to be 
                                                 
6 When we present our main results in Section 2.3, we briefly consider an extension where agents who 
uphold strong family ties make income transfers to their parents. The main results remain qualitatively 
identical, meaning that the absence of transfers from the main framework is not such a critical factor for the 
model’s results and implications.   
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corrupt among Type- w  and Type- s  civil servants.7 Such strategic effects would impose 
significant mathematical complication, thus obscuring the clarity of our analysis without 
adding anything to its main implications.    
  
2.1   The Decisions of Type-w Agents 
Let us consider agents who do not have a desire to retain close ties with their families 
(i.e., j w ). Taking account of (6)-(8), it follows that they will choose to move away from 
their parents’ location, thus earning (1 )hY ω y   units of income from private 
production. As a result, if the civil servant is honest in his involvement with public 
goods delivery, the agents’ utility will be  
 honest honestw wU c a  ,   (9) 
where  
 (1 )honestw hc Y B T ω g y      ,  (10) 
is the agents’ budget constraint. If the civil servant is corrupt, the agents’ income will be 
augmented by the amount of ill-gotten gains that emanate from his rent-seeking. In the 
event that he is detected, however, he will lose all the gains from his employment in the 
public sector – the salary and the proceeds from illegal rent-seeking – while he and his 
partner will face the utility-reducing consequences of the revelation of his fraudulent 
behaviour. Under such circumstances, the Type- w  agents’ (expected) utility is:   
 , ,(1 Μ ) Μ (1 )corrupt corrupt not  detected corrupt detectedw w w w wU c c σ a     . (11) 
Defining the composite term (0,1)βz δ  , we can substitute (1) and (2) to express the 
budget constraints as follows:   
  1corrupt ,not  detectedw hc Y B z G T     (1 )ω gz y   ,  (12)      
 corrupt ,detectedw hc Y T  (1 )ω g b y     .  (13)     
Next, we can combine (3), (4), (10), (12) and (13) to rewrite the utility functions in (9) and 
(11) as 
                                                 
7 Specifically, strategic considerations would emerge because each person’s incentive to be corrupt would 
depend on the provision of public goods, thus on the actions of all other agents who decide whether to be 
corrupt or not.  
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 (1 )honestwU ω g y a    , (14) 
and 
 1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )1 1
corrupt w w
w
μ μU ω gz y ω g b y σ af f
             
,  (15) 
respectively.  
The Type- w  civil servant will be corrupt and engage in illegal rent-seeking as 
long as the agents’ (expected) utility from doing so is at least equal to the utility that 
applies if he decides to abscond from any wrongdoing, i.e., if corrupt honestw wU U . Therefore, 
equating (14) and (15) defines a critical value  
  (1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 )w
g zμ fg z σ ω g b b
       ,  (16) 
such that civil servants for whom w wμ μ  will be corrupt, whereas those for whom 
w wμ μ  will decide to remain honest. In other words, wμ  is also the number of 
corrupted Type- w  civil servants.  
 
2.2   The Decisions of Type-s Agents 
Now, let us consider agents who have a preference for retaining close ties with their 
family (i.e., j s ). Given the characteristics of the model, these agents may actually have 
the incentive to stay in the location of their parents, despite the potential loss of income 
from such a decision. If they do so, the agents’ budget constraint, following the 
substitution of Eq. (1) and (2), will be given by   
 (1 ) with probability(1 ) with probability 1
hhonest
s
l
Y B T ω g y πc Y B T g y π
          
,  (17) 
if the civil servant does not engage in the pursuit of ill-gotten gains, or  
 ,corrupt not  detectedsc    
1 (1 ) with probability
1 (1 ) with probability 1
h
l
Y B z G T ω gz y π
Y B z G T gz y π
               
, (18) 
 ,corrupt detectedsc  (1 ) with probability(1 ) with probability 1
h
l
Y T ω g b y π
Y T g b y π
          
, (19) 
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if he does. In the scenario where Type- s  agents move to new locations, their budget 
constraints will be identical to those of Type- w  ones, i.e., (1 )honestsc ω g y   , 
, (1 )corrupt not  detectedsc ω gz y    and corrupt ,detectedsc  (1 )ω g b y   . Together with (3), (4), (6)-(8) 
and (17)-(19), it follows that the agents’ (expected) utility from consumption, depending 
on whether the civil servant is honest or corrupt, can be written as  
 (1 )honestsU πω g y φ a     ,  (20) 
 1 [(1 ) ] [(1 ) ](1 )corrupt s ss μ μU πω gz y φ πω g b y φ σ af f
              
,  (21) 
if they stay in their parents’ location, and  
 (1 )honestsU ω g y φ a     ,  (22) 
 1 [(1 ) ] [(1 ) ](1 )corrupt s ss μ μU ω gz y φ ω g b y φ σ af f
              
,  (23) 
if they move away from it.  
With the purpose of improving the focus of our analysis, henceforth we shall 
adopt the approach of Alesina et al. (2015) by imposing a condition which guarantees 
that the agents who have preferences for maintaning family ties will find optimal to 
reside close to their parents. It should be noted that this assumption accords with 
evidence showing that strong family ties reduce geographical mobility (Giuliano 2007; 
Alesina and Giuliano 2010). Formally, a sufficient condition is 
 [ (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ] ˆ2
g z π ω σ πω g b b yφ φσ
         .  (24) 
Given the condition in (24), agents with a desire for strong family ties will always choose 
to remain in their parents’ location, meaning that their utility will be given by either (20) 
or (21).8 As a result, we can use these expressions to examine the civil servant’s conduct 
while in public office. In other words, the critical value sμ  for which corrupt honests sU U  can 
be obtained as follows:  
                                                 
8 The condition in (24) guarantees that the lowest level of utility associated with staying in the parents’ 
location (i.e., when a civil servant is corrupt but apprehended with certainty) exceeds the highest level of 
utility associated with residing to a different location (i.e., when a civil servant is corrupt and evades 
detection with certainty).   
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  (1 )
(1 ) (1 )
s
g zμ fσφg z σ πω g b b y

      
.  (25) 
According to (25), civil servants for whom s sμ μ  will engage in the effort to 
extract illegal rents through their involvement with the public sector, whereas civil 
servants for whom s sμ μ  will remain honest. Alternatively, sμ  is also the number of 
Type- s  civil servants who will be corrupt.  
 
2.3   The Impact of Family Ties on the Level of Corruption 
We can combine (16) and (25) to express the total number of corrupt civil servants as   
 Θ (1 ) ( ) Θ( , )w sθ f θ φ f f φ    ,  (26) 
where  
 (1 )(1 ) (1 )w
g zθ g z σ ω g b b
       ,   
(1 )( )
(1 ) (1 )
s
g zθ φ σφg z σ πω g b b y

      
. (27) 
Substitution of (26) in (5) yields  
 {[1 (1 ) ( ) ] ( ) } ( , )w sa gy θ f θ φ f p γ β β a f φ       . (28)   
Next, we define the composite term 
 (1 )φ π ωy  ,  (29) 
which allows us to get the following results: 
 
Lemma 1. Suppose that φˆ φ  . Then Θ( , ) 0f φf
  . 
 
Proof. From (26) it is straightforward to establish that Θ( , ) ( )s wf φ θ φ θf
   . Using the 
expressions in (27) and (29), we see that ( )w sθ θ φ  holds as long as  
 (1 )φ π ωy φ φ     .  
Since the condition in (24) holds, φˆ φ   also implies that φ φ  , thus completing the 
proof.   ■ 
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Lemma 2. Suppose that φˆ φ  . Then: 
i. Θ( , ) 0f φf
    if ˆ( , )φ φ φ  ; 
ii. Θ( , ) 0f φf
    if φ φ  . 
 
Proof. Use the proof of Lemma 1 to establish that ( )w sφ φ θ θ φ    and 
( )w sφ φ θ θ φ   .   ■ 
 
We can formalise the implications on the impact of preferences for strong family 
ties among the population on corruption through  
 
Proposition 1. The impact of an increase in the population share of people with a desire to retain 
close family ties has an ambiguous (i.e., either negative or positive) effect on the incidence of 
corruption.   
 
Proof. It follows from Lemma 2.   ■ 
  
The ambiguity emanates from the fact that, for agents whose values are 
conducive to strong family ties, the utility costs associated with a civil servant’s 
misconduct generate two conflicting effects on the incentive to be corrupt. On the one 
hand, the possible income loss incurred because of their desire to reside close to their 
parents, while relinquishing more productive opportunities elsewhere, mitigates the loss 
in the marginal utility of consumption induced by chastisement and stigma. This is a 
mechanism through which strong family ties cause a higher incidence of corruption.9 An 
alternative interpretation is that, for agents who abide by strong family ties, the ill-
gotten gains of corruption are also viewed as the means of covering the shortfall in 
                                                 
9 Qualitatively, our results would be similar in a scenario where the civil servants’ decisions and the delivery 
of public goods materialise after the production of private goods. This is because, with a fraction 1 π  of 
Type- s  agents earning y  from private production, instead of (1 )ω y , the average (private) income of this 
group would still lack behind the average (private) income among Type- w  agents.    
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productivity and income. On the other hand, however, the utility costs that stem from 
the revelation of a civil servant’s wrongdoing, also mitigate the agents’ enjoyment from 
residing close to their parents. This expected loss in utility acts as a disincentive to 
engage in nefarious activities while in public office, hence generating a mechanism 
through which family ties cause a lower incidence of corruption.  
Note, however, that in addition to distribution of different types of family values 
among the population, our model includes an additional measure of the strength of 
family ties. This is captured by the parameter φ , i.e., the utility value for agents who 
enjoy retaining close ties with their families. In other words, this is a measure of how 
strong is the feeling of family boding among the people who possess preferences for 
retaining ties with their conjugal family.  In order to investigate its implications on the 
model’s main outcomes, consider the result in  
 
Lemma 3. It is Θ( , ) 0f φφ
  . 
 
Proof. Given (27), we have ( ) 0sθ φφ
  . Therefore, from (26) it is straightforward to 
establish that Θ( , ) ( ) 0sf φ θ φ fφ φ
    .   ■ 
 
Now, we can establish the impact of this measure of family ties on corruption by 
means of 10   
 
                                                 
10 On a side-note, it should be clear that the impact of family ties on corruption also dictates the impact on 
the economy and welfare through the effect on the provision of public goods a . After all, corruption is 
manifested through the deliberate choice of less productive projects for the procurement of utility-
enhancing public goods. Consequently, any factor that fuels corruption is bound to reduce the effectiveness 
of the public sector’s production activities, by limiting the amount of goods delivered per unit of public 
investment. To see this, use Eq. (28) and combine with the previous results to verify that  
( , ) [ ( ) ] ( ) 0s wa f φ θ φ θ gyp γ βf
       ( 0)  if  either φˆ φ   or φˆ φ   and φ φ   ˆ( )φ φ φ    whereas 
( , ) ( ) ( ) 0sa f φ θ φ fgyp γ βφ φ
      . 
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Proposition 2. The impact of a stronger desire for family ties, among those with preferences for 
retaining close ties with their families (i.e., a higher φ ), on corruption is unambiguously 
negative.  
 
Proof. It follows from Lemma 3.   ■ 
 
 In terms of intuition, the higher is φ , the stronger is the expected utility loss for 
agents who contemplate the ill-gotten gains of corruption, but who also consider the 
possible repercussions, including the non-pecuniary ones (e.g., imprisonment, shame 
etc.), from the revelation of this wrongdoing. For this reason, the strength of the desire to 
maintain close ties with the conjugal family alleviates the incentive to engage in corrupt 
behaviour.  
A counter-argument to the negative effect of strong family ties on the incentive to 
be corrupt has to do with the redirection of economic resources (including the ‘spoils’ of 
illegal rent-seeking) towards the immediate family. In the context of our model, consider 
agents who care for their parents through the provision of financial resources, as long as 
they abide by strong family values. The argument is that, in this case, family ties may 
increase the incentive to be corrupt because this will increase their ability to provide for 
their families. Although this could be a valid mechanism, the extent to which it can 
completely revert our existing results is questionable. For example, consider a 
modification where the agents’ utility component 1 ( ) ( )κ φ κ φs sc c t   ( ( ) [0,1)κ φ  , (0) 0κ  , 
( ) 0κ φ  ) includes own consumption ( sc ) and a financial transfer to their old parents ( t ) 
– with corresponding modification to the budget constraint(s). If I  denotes the agents’ 
total resources (income from employment plus ill-gotten gains – if any) then 
(1 ( ))sc κ φ I  , ( )t κ φ I  and sc ςI  ( ( ) 1 ( )( ) (1 ( ))κ φ κ φς κ φ κ φ   ) in equilibrium. In other 
words, agents optimally give a fraction ( ) [0,1)κ φ   of their total economic resources to 
their parents – a fraction that is increasing in the strength of family ties – and keep the 
remaining fraction 1 ( )κ φ  for their own consumption. In comparison to the model 
presented in this study, the utility term sc  is sc ςI  instead of sc I , thus the 
mechanisms and results will survive with little change to the model’s implications.      
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There are some important implications from the preceding analysis. Firstly, our 
model provided a theoretical foundation for circumstances when – contrary to the 
conventional wisdom that would view strong family ties as a fillip for corruption - 
factors that are relevant to strong family ties reduce the incidence of corruption. The 
second, and equally important in our opinion, can be clarified through  
 
Proposition 3. The measure of family ties can be crucial in determining its impact on 
corruption. It is possible that a higher population share of people with preferences for retaining 
family ties increases the willingness to be corrupt, whereas, at the same time, a stronger desire for 
family ties, among those with preferences for retaining such ties with their families, reduces the 
willingness to be corrupt.  
 
Proof. It follows from the implications of Proposition 1, Proposition 2, and Lemma 2 for 
ˆ( , )φ φ φ  .   ■    
 
In other words, the ambiguity with respect to the impact of family ties on 
corruption is not only related to the conflicting underlying mechanisms, but it may 
extend to the measure of family ties as well. This is because what matters is not only 
whether people have a desire to retain close ties with their families, but also how strong 
this desire is. The next section presents an empirical analysis that uses micro-level data 
to test the reduced-form hypothesis of a relation between the strength of family ties and 
the approval of corrupt behaviour.    
 
3   Empirical Analysis 
Our empirical analysis focuses on testing outcomes that are more closely related to the 
underlying message of Proposition 2. Furthermore, the micro-level of our analysis 
allows us to discuss several other elements of the model as well.  
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3.1   Individual-Level Data and Empirical Strategy 
In this section, we estimate the impact of family ties on corruption-related attitudes at 
the individual level. We employ the measure employed in Alesina and Giuliano (2010) 
that captures the strength of conjugal family ties. As already highlighted above, we 
totally abstract from kinship and in-group interaction considerations. Our measure is 
actually capturing the degree of love, affection and respect as shaped within families.  
We thus use data from the European Values Study (EVS). The EVS is a large-scale cross-
national survey with four waves covering the 1981-2008 period. In our study we use 
data from all four waves wherever available. Overall, a total of 48 countries are included 
in the cumulative dataset based on the four EVS waves. 
Family Ties 
In line with the benchmark studies that study the role of family ties (e.g., Alesina and 
Giuliano 2010) we use three questions to construct the family ties index. The first 
question asks how important family is for the respondent’s life. Answers vary from 1-4 
with “1” indicating that it is not important at all and “4” indicating that family is very 
important. The second question asks whether love and respect to parent is taken as 
given or whether it should be earned: The value of “1” indicates that it should be earned 
while the value of “2” indicates that it should always be taken for granted. The third 
question asks whether parents should fulfil their responsibilities towards their children 
at the expense of their own well-being: The value of “1” indicates that they should not 
sacrifice their own well-being whereas “2” indicates that they should do the utmost best 
for their children.       
It should be noted that, in the original data from the EVS, answers with higher 
scores indicate a lower strength of family ties. To avoid confusion and 
misunderstanding, we have transformed the variables in the manner described 
previously. Hence, in all three questions, higher values correspond to stronger family 
ties. Furthermore, note that, in order to reduce the number of variables and to combine 
the three components to a single variable, our approach is to conduct a principal 
component analysis and to employ the first component as the explanatory variable.  
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Corruption-Related Attitudes 
In order to measure corruption-related attitudes at the individual level, we use four 
different questions whereby respondents are asked whether they justify the following 
acts: cheating on taxes; claiming state benefits (without being entitled to); accepting a 
bribe; and avoiding paying fare on public transport. Each variable takes values from 1 to 
10 with 1 corresponding to “never” and 10 corresponding to “always”. Thus higher 
values of these variables are associated with more favourable views – and, therefore, a 
greater inclination – towards corruption.11  
A crucial point concerns the use of these measures as proxies for corruption. We 
justify this approach on the basis of the existing literature and our own correlations. As 
far as the existing literature is concerned, there are a number of studies that have also 
employed similar measures, extracted from the EVS and the WVS, as proxies for 
corruption. For example, Torgler and Valev (2010) and Litina and Palivos (2016) 
associate corruption with measures of bribe acceptance and tax cheating, while 
Azariadis and Ioannides (2015) do the same with unentitled benefits claims. With regard 
to our own correlations, we have found that, in most cases, these measures (when 
aggregated at the country level) have a positive correlation with cross-country measures 
of corruption, such as the Corruption Perceptions Index or the ICRG Corruption 
Index.12,13 There are a few comments worth making here. Although the avoidance of 
paying for public transport is not an obvious signal of corruption, it still seems to 
                                                 
11 It is important to note that our results are the same if we use any other question related to cheating or 
corruption, e.g., how justifiable it is to buy stolen goods, and how justifiable it is for people to keep money 
they found. However, we view these questions as less relevant to our study and we thus do not incorporate 
them in our analysis. 
12   The following table reports correlation coefficients between each measure of attitudes and two widely 
known measures of corruption, i.e., the ICRG index and the CPI index, averaged over the period we 
examine. Note that the ICRG and CPI indices are inverse ones, i.e., lower values indicate more corruption.  
 Cheat on 
taxes 
Claim State 
Benefits 
Avoid Fare on Public 
Transport 
Accepting a 
Bribe 
ICRG 1984-
2008 
CPI 
1995-
2008 
Cheat on taxes 1.0000      
Accepting a Bribe 0.4078 1.0000     
Avoid Fare on 
Public Transport 
0.6613 0.4494 1.0000    
Accepting a Bribe 0.5545 0.3997 0.6420 1.0000   
ICRG 1984-2008 -0.0061 -0.1798 -0.3316 -0.3011 1.0000  
CPI 1995-2008 -0.0242 -0.2290 -0.3756 -0.3832 0.9549 1.0000 
 
13 These proxies for corruption are also based on corruption perceptions. However they are aggregated at 
the country level and they combine information from several different sources. As such they are generally 
perceived as country-wide measures that proxy corruption as closely as possible. 
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correlate positively with actual measures of corruption. Perhaps, it reflects a general 
mindset whereby it is acceptable to promote private gains at the expense of the ‘public’ 
good. It is exactly for this reason that we also find the lack of a significant correlation 
between the attitudes towards tax cheating and the corruption indices (despite the 
correlation coefficient having the correct sign). This may reflect the fact that, when 
considering tax morale, corruption is only one of its many facets that include personal 
views on the fairness of the tax system, the need for redistribution etc. Nevertheless, we 
still retain this measure in our analysis, since the link between tax morale and corruption 
is widely documented and accepted in the literature (e.g., Togler 2014).14  
Reduced-Form Specification 
Our main empirical analysis focuses on testing a hypothesis that is conceptually closer to 
the underlying message of Proposition 2, as it considers the impact of the intensive 
margin of family ties. We estimate the reduced-form specification term 
 0 1 2ict ict ict c t ictCA a a FT a Controls I R ε      . (30) 
where ictCA denotes the attitudes towards corruption of an individual i  who lives in 
country c  and participates in round t , and ictFT  is the measure of family ties, i.e, the 
principal component of the previously mentioned variables. The variable ictControls  is a 
vector of individual-level controls including age, age squared, gender, education, 
religion and employment status. The term cI  denotes country fixed effects and aims to 
capture unobservables associated with the country in which individuals reside, and tR  
denotes EVS round fixed effects, thus capturing unobservables related to the timing of 
the interview that are common across countries. Finally, ictε  is the error term. 
Naturally, our coefficient of interest in Eq. (30) is 1a . This will identify the impact 
of family ties on the proxies of corruption-related attitudes, accounting for other 
individual characteristics as well as country and year effects. A point worth mentioning 
is that the country fixed effects absorb elements that are explicitly mentioned in the 
model, such as the role of government and the level of public goods. This does not imply 
                                                 
14 In the same line of reasoning, we also confirmed our results using other measures of misbehaviour 
(related to stolen goods or lost money). As mentioned previously, these are not reported here as they are not 
particularly relevant to our study. 
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that these factors do not play a role in our empirical analysis. On the contrary country 
fixed effects are crucial in terms of identification, precisely because they capture the 
important role played by differences across countries in all these respects. We just net 
out these effects via the use of fixed effects so as to uncover the role played by family ties 
on corruption, conditional on all these controls. 
“Should I Stay or Should I Go?” 
Once we obtain the reduced form results, we make a further attempt to nail down one of 
the important characteristics of our theoretical model, i.e., the proximity to the family in 
terms of location. We argue in the model that people who have stronger ties with their 
family may choose to stay close to them at the expense of their productivity, while those 
with looser family ties are more likely to change location – which ultimately results in 
higher productivity as already argued in Alesina and Giuliano (2010).15  
 According to Proposition 2, the impact of the strength of family ties on 
corruption is unambiguously negative. Based on this prediction, we expect that if we 
split the sample into those who stay vs those who leave their parents’ location, the 
former will be the ones who are primarily driving the result of the decline in corruption. 
The EVS allows us to identify people who move across NUTS regions. There is one 
question asking them in which NUTS region they lived when they were aged 14 and in 
which NUTS region they currently live. We thus assume that the NUTS region at age 14 
is the region in which they lived with their parents and the current one is the new 
residency most likely chosen for occupational reasons. Of course, we cannot preclude 
the family moving along with the respondent. Nevertheless, we treat these deviations as 
non-systematic as we do not see any plausible arguments to suggest anything systematic 
in such cases. Furthermore, we restrict our sample of movers and stayers to working age 
population aged 18-65.16  
                                                 
15 As mentioned previously, the adoption of this characteristic in our theoretical framework follows Alesina 
et al. (2015).  
16 Below we present the table of the summary statistics for stayers vs leavers for the family ties variable and 
for the strength of family ties variable. We observe than, in line with our model assumptions, stayers 
manifest both stronger family ties and have lower income as compared to leavers.  
 
 
 
 23
Given the above, we estimate the following equation:  
 0 1 1 2ict ict stayers ict leavers ict c t ictCA a a FT I a FT I a Controls I R ε         . (31) 
The notation is exactly as in Eq. (30). The only difference lies in the terms 1 ict stayersa FT I  
and 1 ict leaversa FT I   which are the interaction terms obtained for the measure of family ties 
in each regime, i.e., staying in the same NUTS or moving to a different NUTS. In line 
with our theory, we expect to obtain a different coefficient for each group. Moreover, we 
expect these differences to appear in the magnitude of these coefficients – not in their 
sign.  
 
3.2 Empirical Results 
Benchmark Specification 
Table 1 reports estimates on the impact of the measure of family ties on attitudes 
towards corruption. The dependent variable in Column (1) is “Justifiable: Cheating on 
taxes”; in Column (2) is “Justifiable: To claim state benefits (without being entitled to them)”; 
in Column (3) is “Justifiable: Accepting a bribe”; and in Column (4) is “Justifiable: Avoiding 
fare on public transport”. The analysis controls for the full set of relevant demographic, 
socio-economic and household characteristics (i.e., age, age squared, gender, education, 
religion and employment status), as well as the EVS round and country fixed effects. In 
all four columns we find that stronger family ties are associated with less favourable 
attitudes towards corruption. In Table 1 Line II reports the logit model coefficient 
whereas, in terms of magnitude, the coefficients reported in Line I are standardised beta 
coefficients. Their range of values lies mostly around -0.1 suggesting that a unitary 
change in the standard deviation of the family ties measure is associated with a standard 
deviation change of around -0.1 in most of the measures of corruption. Overall, these are 
                                                                                                                                                 
 Obs Mean Std Min Max 
Stayers      
Family Ties 44,028 0.034 1.083 -5.156 0.865 
Income 44,028 4.466 2.660 1 12 
      
Leavers      
Family Ties 3,706 -0.035 1.131 -5.156 0.865 
Income 3,706 5.171 2.681 1 12 
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not very strong effects, at least not for the full sample (as we shall see shortly, they will 
become stronger once we distinguish between people who leave their parents’ location 
and people who stay in it). Nevertheless, they are systematic and emerge in all different 
specifications, even after having controlled for several demographic, country and time-
invariant characteristics. 
 
 
Table 1. Benchmark specification: The impact of family ties on attitudes related to corruption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Justifiable to: 
 Cheat on Tax Claim State Benefits Accept a Bribe Avoid Transport Fare 
I. Family Ties (PC) -0.093*** -0.057*** -0.094*** -0.099*** 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) 
Age -0.216*** -0.229*** -0.273*** 0.404*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) 
Age Sq. 0.099** 0.113*** 0.176*** 0.246*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gender -0.055*** -0.016*** -0.040*** 0.037*** 
 (0.030) (0.020) (0.018) (0.028) 
Obs. 69,021 68,858 69,432 57,847 
R-Sq. 0.094 0.129 0.082 0.134 
II. Family Ties (Logit) -0.097*** 
(0.016) 
-0.071*** 
(0.021) 
-0.147*** 
(0.021) 
-0.096*** 
(0.021) 
EVS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Summary: This table establishes that stronger family ties are associated with less favourable attitudes towards corruption. 
The analysis controls for individual characteristics such as age, age squared, gender, educational level, employment 
status, religious denomination as well as for EVS round and country fixed effects. 
Notes: (i) the attitudes-related variables (“justifiable to: cheat on tax; claim state benefits; accept a bribe; avoid transport 
fare”) take values from 1-10 with 10 indicating “always justifiable”; (ii) the “family ties” variable is the principal 
component of three variables, “how important in family in your life”, “love and respect parents: always/earned”, 
“parents’ responsibilities to their children: at expense of/not sacrifice own well-being”. Higher values of the variable 
indicate stronger family ties; (iii) Robust standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country of origin, are 
reported in parentheses; (iv) *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level, all 
for two-sided hypothesis tests. 
 
 
Table 1A reports the coefficients when we distinguish between each group 
explicitly. We observe that in all four columns the coefficient is negative for both groups.  
Moreover, with the exception of Column (2), where we have the measure for claiming 
state benefits, in all other cases it is the group of people who never moved away from 
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their family’s location that has a stronger effect on corruption. The coefficients are 
expressed in standardized beta units and are around the value -0.20 for those who stay 
and -0.12 for those who leave (always with the exception of the measure of state 
benefits). In other words, a unitary standard deviation increase in the principal 
component of family ties is associated with up to a 0.20 standard deviation reduction in 
our measure of corruption. This is a rather non-trivial effect. To make it more 
comprehensible, think that a unit change in the measure of family ties, which ranges 
between -5 and 0.8 (negative values appear due to the use of principal component 
analysis), is associated with a 0.9 change in the measure of corruption, which ranges 
between 1 and 10.  
 
 
Table 1A. Stayers vs Leavers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Justifiable to: 
 Cheat on Tax Claim State Benefits Accept a Bribe Avoid Transport Fare 
Family Ties (Stayers) -0.191*** -0.125*** -0.150*** -0.207*** 
 (0.026) (0.001) (0.022) (0.022) 
Family Ties (Leavers) -0.127*** -0.194*** -0.117*** -0.191*** 
 (0.050) (0.003) (0.004) (0.033) 
EVS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 30,026 34,947 35,203 35,119 
R-Sq. 0.082 0.135 0.094 0.130 
Summary: This table distinguishes the effect of family ties on corruption based on the status of individuals, i.e., it 
separates leavers from stayers. The analysis shows that the effect of stayers is stronger than that of leavers. The analysis 
controls for individual characteristics such as age, age squared, gender, educational level, employment status, religious 
denomination as well as for EVS round and country fixed effects. 
Notes: (i) the attitudes-related variables (“justifiable to: cheat on tax; claim state benefits; accept a bribe; avoid transport 
fare”) take values from 1-10 with 10 indicating “always justifiable”; (ii) the “family ties” variable is the principal 
component of three variables, “how important in family in your life”, “love and respect parents: always/earned”, 
“parents’ responsibilities to their children: at expense of/not sacrifice own well-being”. Higher values of the variable 
indicate stronger family ties; (iii) Robust standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country of origin, are 
reported in parentheses; (iv) *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level, all 
for two-sided hypothesis tests. 
 
Robustness 
Table 2 replicates the analysis in Table 1 by adopting a more stringent specification. 
Specifically, we employ a full set of regional fixed effects at the NUTS 2 level. The reason 
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why we do not adopt this specification from the outset is because we have significantly 
fewer observations. Importantly though, the results remain highly significant and 
similar to the benchmark specification. 
 Table 3 tests the robustness of the explanatory variable by employing another 
measure that is widely used in this literature. This is the sum of the three variables that 
are used as measures of the strength of family ties, as opposed to their principal 
component. To do this, we first make the three variables similar in terms of scale – in 
this case, we bring them to a scale from 1 to 2 – with higher values still indicating 
stronger family ties. Subsequently, we use their sum instead of the first component. 
Columns (1) to (4) refer to the same dependent variables as in Table 1 and they use the 
same full set of controls. The results are – qualitatively and quantitatively – very similar. 
It should be noted that, although not reported here, similar results are also obtained if, 
instead of their sum, we use each of the three measures that are incorporated in the 
family ties index separately. 
Table 4 tests the robustness of the benchmark analysis, using the sample from the WVS 
instead. All the variables and the controls are defined in the same exact way, given that 
the two surveys (EVS and WVS) are standardised in terms of questions. The results are 
strikingly similar both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
 
Table 2. Robustness: Regional fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Justifiable to: 
 Cheat on Tax Claim State Benefits Accept a Bribe Avoid Transport Fare 
Family Ties  -0.169*** -0.057*** -0.112*** -0.176*** 
 (0.021) (0.017) (0.016) (0.021) 
EVS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 23,092 23,038 23,248 13,172 
R-Sq. 0.160 0.174 0.135 0.204 
Summary: This table establishes the robustness of the results in Table 1 by controlling for regional fixed effects. 
Notes: (i) the attitudes-related variables (“justifiable to: cheat on tax; claim state benefits; accept a bribe; avoid transport 
fare”) take values from 1-10 with 10 indicating “always justifiable”; (ii) the “family ties” variable is the principal 
component of three variables, “how important in family in your life”, “love and respect parents: always/earned”, 
“parents’ responsibilities to their children: at expense of/not sacrifice own well-being”. Higher values of the variable 
indicate stronger family ties; (iii) Robust standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country of origin, are 
reported in parentheses; (iv) *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level, all 
for two-sided hypothesis tests. 
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Table 3. Robustness: Alternative measures of family ties 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Justifiable to: 
 Cheat on Tax Claim State Benefits Accept a Bribe Avoid Transport Fare 
Family Ties (Sum) -0.169*** -0.090*** -0.111*** -0.213*** 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.019) 
EVS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 77,718 77,495 78,239 64,971 
R-Sq. 0.091 0.125 0.080 0.134 
Summary: This table establishes the robustness of the results to the use of an alternative measure for family ties. The 
analysis controls for individual characteristics such as age, age squared, gender, educational level, employment status, 
religious denomination as well as for EVS round and country fixed effects. 
Notes: (i) the attitudes-related variables (“justifiable to: cheat on tax; claim state benefits; accept a bribe; avoid transport 
fare”) take values from 1-10 with 10 indicating “always justifiable”; (ii) the “family ties” variable is the principal 
component of three variables, “how important in family in your life”, “love and respect parents: always/earned”, 
“parents’ responsibilities to their children: at expense of/not sacrifice own well-being”. Higher values of the variable 
indicate stronger family ties; (iii) Robust standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country of origin, are 
reported in parentheses; (iv) *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level, all 
for two-sided hypothesis tests. 
 
 
Table 4. Robustness: World Values Surveys 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Justifiable to: 
 Cheat on Tax Claim State Benefits Accept a Bribe Avoid Transport Fare 
Family Ties (WVS) -0.161*** -0.116*** -0.101*** -0.146*** 
 (0.022) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) 
EVS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 103,077 100,783 105,095 101,508 
R-Sq. 0.107 0.080 0.094 0.130 
Summary: This table establishes the robustness of the results to the use of an alternative sample, i.e., the World Values 
Survey. The analysis controls for individual characteristics such as age, age squared, gender, educational level, 
employment status, religious denomination as well as for EVS round and country fixed effects. 
Notes: (i) the attitudes-related variables (“justifiable to: cheat on tax; claim state benefits; accept a bribe; avoid transport 
fare”) take values from 1-10 with 10 indicating “always justifiable”; (ii) the “family ties” variable is the principal 
component of three variables, “how important in family in your life”, “love and respect parents: always/earned”, 
“parents’ responsibilities to their children: at expense of/not sacrifice own well-being”. Higher values of the variable 
indicate stronger family ties; (iii) Robust standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country of origin, are 
reported in parentheses; (iv) *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level, all 
for two-sided hypothesis tests. 
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4   Conclusions 
This purpose of this paper was to contribute to a further understanding of issues 
surrounding the relation between family ties and corruption. Our theoretical model 
showed that the overall effect of family ties on the incentive to be corrupt – and, 
therefore, on the incidence of corruption – can be ambiguous due to the presence of 
conflicting mechanisms. Our theory also pinpointed the possibility that the impact on 
corruption may be quite different, depending on the what measures family ties – either 
the population measure of the share of agents who abide by a desire for maintaining 
close family ties, or the micro-level measure of how strong the desire for close family ties 
actually is. This is a point with major implications, as it offers a theoretical foundation on 
why the conventional wisdom entailing cross-country reflections may be at odds with 
the outcomes of micro-level empirical investigations.  
The empirical approach we adopted belongs to the latter category, as it used 
micro-level data to examine the effect of family ties on the approval of activities that 
proxy for corruption – activities such as bribery, tax evasion etc. Our empirical results 
verified that, at the individual level, stronger family ties are associated with reduced 
corruption, thus offering credence to the relevant result from our theory.  
 Naturally, our theoretical model is stylised in many respects, in order to ensure 
its analytical tractability and the clarity of the intuition. As a result, while it directs 
attention to some intuitive mechanisms, unavoidably it does not incorporate other 
examples that can identify additional links on the relation between family ties and 
corruption. One such example is nepotism. It should be noted, however, that this is not a 
major shortcoming since our focus is on the strength of conjugal family ties. Issues 
pertaining to nepotism would be more relevant to an investigation of extended kinship 
ties and their relation to corruption. Another issue on which our theory is not explicit is 
the cultural transmission process for characteristics such as the preferences for retaining 
strong family ties or the attitudes towards corruption. Given the underlying empirical 
motivation, we opted for a simple static model that focuses on the relation between the 
two variables of interest (family ties and corruption) without undermining the clarity of 
the mechanisms through the addition of cultural transmission dynamics. This by no 
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means imply that the issue of cultural transmission is less important. On the contrary, it 
certainly represents a worth-pursuing avenue for future research.     
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
A.1 EVS and WVS Variables 
 
Family Ties 
Family Ties (Principal Component): We use three questions to construct the family ties 
index. The first question is “How important is family in your life?”. Answers vary from 1-4 
with 1 indicating “not at all important” and 4 indicating “very important”. The second 
question asks whether love and respect to parent is taken as given or whether it should 
be earned. 1 indicates that it should be earned and 2 that it should always be taken for 
granted. The third question asks whether parents should fulfil their responsibilities 
towards their children at the expense of their own well-being. 1 indicates that they 
should not sacrifice their own well-being and 2 that they should do the utmost best for 
their children.  
Overall, in all three questions higher values indicate stronger family times. In 
order to reduce the number of variables and to combine the three components to a single 
variable we conduct a Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Family Ties (Sum): This alternative measure of family ties is the sum of the same three 
questions. To take the sum we give the same scale to all the variable, i.e., from 1 to 2, 
with higher values indicating stronger family ties. 
 
Attitudes Related to Corruption 
Justifiable: To Cheat on Taxes: This variable answers to the question “To what extend do 
you find it justifiable to cheat on taxes?” The variable takes values from 1 to 10 with 1 
denoting “never” and 10 denoting “always”. 
 
Justifiable: To Claim Benefits: This variable answers to the question “To what extend do 
you find it justifiable to claim benefits one is not entitled to?”. The variable takes values from 
1 to 10 with 1 denoting “never” and 10 denoting “always”. 
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Justifiable: To Take Bribes: This variable answers to the question “To what extend do you 
find it justifiable to take bribes?” The variable takes values from 1 to 10 with 1 denoting 
“never” and 10 denoting “always”. 
 
Justifiable: To Avoid Fare on Public Transport: This variable answers to the question 
“To what extend do you find it justifiable to avoid fare on public transport?” The variable takes 
values from 1 to 10 with 1 denoting “never” and 10 denoting “always”. 
 
Individual Controls 
Age: The age of the respondent. 
 
Female: A binary variable taking the value of 1 if the individual is female and 0 if the 
individual is male. 
 
Education: Education is an ordered variable taking values from 1-3 with 1 denoting 
“tertiary completed”, 2 denoting “secondary completed” and 3 denoting “primary completed”. 
The same classification is used for the controls of paternal, maternal and spouse 
education. 
 
Religion: Religion takes nine different values each associated with a different religious 
denomination. 
 
Employment Status: The employment status of the respondent is a categorical variable 
taking values from 1-4 as follows: 1 is “full-time”, 2 is “part-time or self-employed”, 3 is “not 
participant (student, retired, other)” and 4 is “unemployed”. 
 
Stayers vs Leavers: The EVS allows us to identify people who move across NUTS 
regions. There is one question asking them in which NUTS region they lived when they 
were aged 14 and in which NUTS region they currently live. Based on this variable we 
construct an index that takes the value 0 if the individual lives in the same NUTS as the 
one he lived when they were 14 years old and the value 1 otherwise. 
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A.3 Country-level Variables 
 
Corruption 
CPI: We use the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) as a proxy for corruption at the 
country level. The variable takes values from 1 (least corrupt) to 10 (most corrupt). We 
have rescaled the original index for consistency with the individual measures of 
corruption. 
 
ICRG. We use the ICRG measure of corruption as a proxy for corruption at the country 
level. The variable takes values from 1 (least corrupt) to 6 (most corrupt). We have 
rescaled the original index for consistency with the individual measures of corruption. 
 
 
